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Abstract
Most of the web applications are associated with database as back-end so there
are possibilities of SQL injection attacks (SQLIA) on it. Even SQLIA is among
top ten attacks according to Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) but
still approaches are not able to give proper solution to this problem. Numbers of
measures are also discovered to overcome this attack, but which measure is more
convenient and can also provide fast access to application without compromising the
security is also a major concern. Some existing approaches are good in security but
they are not ecient to handle large user's requests. To overcome these two issues at
the same moment Bitslice AES encryption and parallel AES encryption using CUDA
are used to prevent this attack. Bitslice AES uses a non-standard representation,
and view the processor as a SIMD computer, i.e. as 64 parallel one-bit processors
computing the same instruction. As AES round functions are good candidate for
parallel computations, AES encryption using CUDA gives tremendous encryptions
per second and application response remains constant even if users requests increase.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
To prevent SQL injection one of the common measure is to use client side validation
where all the strings from the submitted form are checked corresponding to data
type, length or for any other set of malicious characters [1]. Tokenization in client
side validation is also one of the approach where data from all the elds are fetched
and converted to tokens and later these tokens are used to match with original
query [2]. But only client side validation is not enough as attacks can also be possible
using cookies where modied cookie can contain malicious string. Even attacks can
be possible if header is modied and it can bypass the submitted form [9]. To
avoid such issues, encryption mechanism is proposed. This makes it possible to
overcome the attacks by cookies, headers or even by second order injection like
Trojan horse [10]. Encryption solved major security issues but if in a web form the
numbers of elds are much more and also millions of users are accessing the form at
the same moment then encryption of all elds will be a great overhead.
In this paper, Bitslice AES encryption technique is introduced, where if m elds
are there in a web form and n users are accessing it simultaneously then (n x m)
encryption can be done in parallel. This gives almost constant time to access the
application without compromising the security.
1
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1.1 Existed Encryption Mechanisms
Over the past years, there has been plenty of research going on in the both academic
institutes as well as industries to prevent injection attacks [?]. Following are some
encryption mechanism proposed by researchers which has been seen as more eective
one.
1.1.1 "An Authentication Scheme using Hybrid
Encryption" (Indrani Balasundaram,
E.Ramaraj)-(2011)
They proposed an algorithm which uses both Advance Encryption Standard (AES)
and Rivest-Shamir-Adleman(RSA) to prevent SQL injection attacks [12]. In this
method a unique secret key is xed or assigned for every client or user. On the
server side server uses private key and public key combination for RSA encryption.
In this method, two level of encryption is applied on login query:
 To encrypt user name and password symmetric key encryption is used with
the help of user's secret key.
 To encrypt the query the scheme uses asymmetric key encryption by using
public key of the server.
The disadvantages of this approach:
 It is not made for URL based SQL injection attacks.
 It is Very dicult to maintain every user secret key at server side and client
side.
 There is no security mechanism at registration phase.
 Not ecient when large numbers of user accessing the application
simultaneously.
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Figure 1.1: Login and Verication Phase
 Vulnerable to cache timing analysis.
1.1.2 "SQLrand: Preventing SQL Injection Attacks"
(Stephen W.Boyd , Angelos D.Keromytis)
It uses randomization to encrypt SQL keywords [19]. However the main drawbacks
of this approach are
 This needs an additional proxy.
 Computational overhead and the need to remember the keywords.
3
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Figure 1.2: SQLrand System Architecture
1.1.3 "Random4: An Application Specic Randomized
Encryption Algorithm to Prevent SQL Injection"
(2012)
Their approach is based on SQLrand [5, 19] and randomization algorithm is used to
convert the input into a cipher text incorporating the concept of cryptographic salt.
However the main aws in this approach are
 Use of lookup table that is not an ecient way.
 Can't handle second order SQL injection attack.
However in our approach all these drawbacks are concerned and proposed solution
is secure and ecient.
1.1.4 SQL Injection Background
Why SQL Injection is a major Threat?
The vulnerability trends indicate that signicant portion of the vulnerabilities are
in applications [25]. Further Cross site scripting and SQL injection are prominent
application vulnerabilities among those reported in applications. The SQL injection
attacks pose greater risk due to the fact that they impact databases which are critical
to any organization. From response perspective also, the remedial action need to
4
Chapter 1 Introduction
be taken by the developer or programmer since the aw need to be corrected by
code level changes. This requires comparatively longer times to take corrective
actions after SQL injection vulnerabilities are detected. The attack trends also
indicate that SQL injection vulnerabilities are exploited during recent years, in mass
scale on vulnerable web applications. Mass scale web intrusions were carried out
by ASPROX botnet during 2008 and 2010 which resulted in infection of number
of websites in a short span of time. ASPROX used specially formed malicious
SQL queries to inltrate vulnerable databases. In a typical attack ASPROX used
Google queries to harvest vulnerable ASP pages and carried out SQL injection
and subsequently inserting iFrame links into databases. These iFrames were used
to conduct drive-by-download attacks wherein visitors of aected websites are
redirected to malicious websites which are used to propagate malware on to users
systems. Hence, SQL Injection could be very dangerous in many cases depending
on the platform where the attack is launched and it gets success in injecting rogue
users to the target system.
Impact of SQL Injection
As we already mentioned SQL injection attack is accomplished by providing data
(inclusion of SQL queries) from an external source which is further used to
dynamically construct a SQL query. The impact and consequences of SQL injection
attacks can be classied as follows:
 Condentiality: Loss of condentiality is a major problem with SQL Injection
attacks since SQL databases generally hold sensitive and critical information
which could be viewed by unauthorized users as a consequence of successful
SQL injection attack.
 Integrity: Successful SQL injection attack allows external source to make
unauthorized modications such as altering or even deleting information from
target databases.
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 Authentication: Poorly written SQL queries do not properly validate user
names and passwords, which allows unauthenticated entity or attacker to
connect to the aected database or application as an authenticated user,
without initial knowledge of the password or even user name.
 Authorization: Successful exploitation of SQL injection vulnerability, allows
attacker to change authorization information and gain elevated privileges if
the authorization information is stored in the aected database In real world
scenario, it is very hard to detect the SQL injection prior to its impact. In
most number of scenarios, unauthorized activity is performed by the attacker
through valid user credentials or by using inherent features of database
application such as malicious modication of existing SQL Queries of web
application that are accessing critical sections of the aected databases.
1.2 Motivation
Some existing encrytion mechanism to prevent sql injection attacks are good in
security but they are not ecient to handle large user's requests. To overcome
these two issues at the same moment, Bitslice AES encryption and parallel AES
encryption using Compute Unied Device Architecture(CUDA) can provide a better
solution to prevent this attack. Bitslice AES uses a non-standard representation,
and view the processor as a SIMD computer, i.e. as 64 parallel one-bit processors
computing the same instruction. As AES round functions are good candidate for
parallel computations, AES encryption using CUDA gives tremendous encryptions
per second and application response remains constant even if users requests increase.
1.3 Organization of thesis
Rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II discuses Bitslice AES technique.
Chapter III introduces CUDA progamiing model and how parallel encryption is done
6
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using it. Chapter IV have details about the proposed mechanism i.e prevention of
SQLIA using bitslice AES and AES on CUDA. Chapter V have implementation and
results of the proposed mechanism. Finally, Chapter VI concludes the thesis.
7
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Bitslice AES
One of the non conventional but ecient ways to implement AES in software is
Bit-slice. It involves converting the algorithm into a series of logical bit operations
using AND, OR, XOR and NOT logic gates. When implemented on a microprocessor
with a N-bit register width, each bit in the register acts as a 1 bit processor doing
a dierent encryption, therefore N encryptions are done in parallel. This result in
tremendous throughput [2, 3].
Also this implementation is free from cache timing attacks. Traditional ciphers
make use of several tables to improve performance but that led to memory access
pattern of the implementation and make it vulnerable to cryptanalysis [6, 13, 14].
However bitslice implementation is based on logical operation and free from cache
timing attack.
2.1 Encryption Mechanism
In bit-slicing we use a non-standard representation and view the processor as a SIMD
computer. In order to encrypt the input, rst number of words required to store
each AES input in memory are calculated. As shown in gure 3.4, if we have N bit
microprocessor then we require 128/N words to store each AES input. So if we have
64 bit microprocessor then we need 128/64 i.e. two words to store each AES input.
8
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Figure 2.1: Storage of AES input in memory for 64 bit processor
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Figure 2.2: Rearrangement of bits in words
Here, 64 AES inputs are taken and therefore we need 128 words in memory to store
these inputs. In each word 64 bits can be stored and therefore 128 AES input require
2 words. Now we need to rearrange bits in these words so that rst bit of each word
contains rst AES input. Second bit of each word contain second AES input. Third
bit of each word contain third AES input and so on. The nal arrangement is shown
in Figure 2.2. After rearrangement we can see that each bit layer of words have
particular AES input and it forms the basis of parallel processing. All the AES
operations are converted to logical operations. Now each layer of words in memory
i.e. particular AES input is passed through Round function.
The rst transformation in round function is Substitute byte. In substitute
function, instead of using table look that led to the cache crypt analysis, Rijmen
gave the idea that S Boxes can be implemented using combinational logics [6]. Eli
Biham in his paper A Fast New DES Implementation in Software modied the S
Box logic circuit and gate count of logic circuit is reduced to 100 gates [4]. Matthew
Kwan's further modify the S box generation algorithm and gate count is reduced
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to average of 53.375 gates per S Boxes for DES [5]. Currently Roman Rusakov
introduced the S box in just 44.125 gates per S-box and its implementation is used
in John the Ripper cracker [15].
For AES as there is just one S Box, the gate count for it according to reference [3]
is 132, so there is much scope to further reduce it. Source program of Bitsliced AES
Sbox in x64 assembly language can be found from reference [16]. After substitute
byte transformation, the shift rows operation is carried out by move operation where
second row of the state is shifted left by eight bits, the third row by sixteen bits and
the fourth row by twenty four bits. The nal state after substitute byte and shift
row is shown in gure 2.3. In mix column transformation we multiply the column
of the state matrix with permutation of [2 3 1 1]. If multiplication leads to overow
then constant 1B16 is added. The Add round adds each word from memory to
corresponding word of key in memory. Further equations of MixColumn, ShiftRows,
AddRoundKey, Overow constant and RoundKey(key) can be added at one place.
Output for rst byte can be summarized as follows:
Bit'0= Bit40+Bit80+Bit120+ Key0+ overow
Bit'1= Bit0+ Bit40+ Bit41+ Bit81+ Bit121+ Key1+ overow
Bit'2= Bit1+ Bit41+ Bit42+ Bit82+ Bit122+ Key2
Bit'3= Bit2+ Bit42+ Bit43+ Bit83+ Bit123+ Key3+ overow
Bit'4= Bit3+ Bit43+ Bit44+ Bit84+ Bit124+ Key4+ overow
Bit'5= Bit4+ Bit44+ Bit45+ Bit85+ Bit125+ Key5
Bit'6= Bit5+ Bit45+ Bit46+ Key86+ Bit126+ Key6
Bit'7= Bit6+ Bit46+ Bit47+ Bit87+ Bit127+ Key7
where, overow=Bit7+ Bit47
2.2 Summary
In this chapter, we have seen how AES encryption can be implemented using
bitslicing technique. This implementation is also free from cache timing attack.In
11
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Figure 2.3: Final state after substitute byte and shift row transformation
bit-slicing we use a non-standard representation and view the processor as a SIMD
computer.It involves converting the algorithm into a series of logical bit operations
using AND, OR, XOR and NOT logic gates. When implemented on a microprocessor
with a N-bit register width, each bit in the register acts as a 1 bit processor doing
a dierent encryption, therefore N encryptions are done in parallel. In the next
chapter, we will see how AES encryption can be done using CUDA on GPU.
12
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CUDA PROGRAMMING
MODEL
CUDA stands for (compute unied device architecture) and provide parallel
computing platform and programming model that increases computing performance
by harnessing the power of the graphics processing unit (GPU). It is best to solve
the problems that are intensive to data parallel computations i.e. the same program
is executed on many data elements in parallel with high arithmetic intensity, the
ratio of arithmetic operations to memory operations.
At CUDA core, the following key abstractions are there a hierarchy of thread
groups, shared memories, and barrier synchronizatio. All these for a programmer
are just as minimal set of extensions to C.This helps to provide data parallelism and
thread parallelism, along with coarse-grained data parallelism and task parallelism.
Programmer can now partition the problem into coarse sub-problems which can
be solved independently in parallel, and later into ner pieces which can be solved
cooperatively in parallel. This decomposition allows threads to perform correctly
while solving sub-problems, and also enables transparent scalability because every
sub-problem can be solved on any of the available processor cores: Therefore we can
execute compiled CUDA program on any number of processor cores, and physical
13
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Figure 3.1: The GPU Devotes More Transistors to Data Processing
processor count is required by only the runtime system.
CUDA features a parallel data cache or on-chip shared memory with very fast
general read and writes access, that threads use to share data each other. As opposed
to regular C functions, CUDA has the capability to dene C functions, also called
kernels, that can execute N times in parallel by N dierent CUDA threads. The
threads that executes the kernel is given a unique thread ID that can be accessed
through in built-in threadIdx variable. threadIDx is a 3-component vector and
it involves one-dimensional, two-dimensional or three dimensional index forming a
one-dimensional, two-dimensional or three dimensional thread block. However the
relation between thread and its ID is same for one dimensional block but dierent
for two-dimensional and three dimensional block. For a two-dimensional block of
size (Dx, Dy), the thread ID of a thread of thread of index (x, y) is (x+yDx) and for
a three dimensional block of size (Dx, Dy, Dz) the thread ID of a thread of index (x,
y, z) is (x+yDx+zDxDy). Threads in a block synchronize themselves using shared
memory. We can also execute kernel by using multiple equally shaped threads blocks.
Such blocks can be arranged in a one-dimensional or two-dimensional grid of thread
blocks.
The CUDA threads shown in 3.2 are structured hierarchically, i.e. a maximum
of 512 threads forming a thread block which can be 1-, 2- or 3-dimensional, and
thread blocks forming a 1- or 2-dimensional grid. Another important concept is
14
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thread scheduling. When a kernel is launched, every stream multiprocessor (SM)
is assigned a thread block. A warp, which consists of 32 threads, is executed
simultaneously on a SM at any time [22]. Though the warp is not a concept of CUDA
specication, good understanding to it can assist achieving high performance. One
principle in optimizing a CUDA program is to keep all the threads in a warp working
eciently and none of them is doing useless work. Five types of memory are exposed
to developers through CUDA, namely global memory, constant memory, texture
memory, shared memory and registers. Shared memory and register are high speed
on-chip memory; global memory, constant memory and texture memory all reside
in the DRAM on board. Global memory is not cached while constant memory and
texture memory are cached and therefore the later two can also be accessed very fast
when there is no cache miss match. However, constant memory and texture memory
are read-only. CUDA uses C programming language with a minimal extension which
can greatly facilitate the learning. More information about the extension can be
found in [21, 23, 24]. In order to run CUDA threads we need a separate device that
behaves as a coprocessor to the actual host running the actual c program. Host
can accommodate serial code but to execute parallel kernel we need to make use of
device. We can also call parallel kernels in between the serial code.
3.1 AES on GPU
We need an ecient encryption kernel to fully utilize the parallel computing power
of GPU. All the AES transformations are good candidate to run parallel on GPU.
The rst step before beginning the encryption process is to make cudaMalloc API
calls to GPU device for allocating memory to plaintext, ciphertext, expanded key
and AES tables [20].
15
Chapter 3 CUDA PROGRAMMING MODEL
Figure 3.2: Grid of Thread Blocks
16
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Figure 3.3: Serial and parallel code execution on host and device respectively17
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These buers are created in the global memory or D-RAM of the GPU.
Inputdata, expanded key, and the AES tables are then copied from the host to the
device using the cudaMemcpy API call.
Now in order to frequently access the expanded key and plaintext both of them
are loaded to shared memory by using the variable as follows :
Where, share-plaintext and shared-roundkey are the variables of plaintext and
expanded key respectively, which reside in the shared memory space of a thread
block. thread-id refers to the thread ID.
To allow fast implementation of AES on processor we can make use of table
lookups that can combine all the round transformations in a single set.
Fo the key addition and the MixColumn transformation, we have
18
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Figure 3.4: Parallel AES encryption
19
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For the ShiftRow and the ByteSub transformations, we have:
We dene tables T0 to T3 :
These are 4 tables with 256 4-byte word entries and make up for 4KByte of
total space. Using these tables, the round transformation can be expressed as:
20
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3.2 Summary
In this chapter, we have seen how AES encryption can be done on GPU using CUDA.
CUDA is best to solve the problems that are intensive to data parallel computations
i.e. the same program is executed on many data elements in parallel with high
arithmetic intensity, the ratio of arithmetic operations to memory operations. All
the AES transformations are good candidate to run parallel on GPU. In the next
chapter, we will see how Bitslice AES and AES encryption using CUDA can be used
to defend SQL injection attack.
21
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Proposed Mechanism
To defend the SQLIA we need to concern all phases of an application (i.e.
Registration, Login and Search phase).
Registration Phase
In registration phase a user lls the form by relevant details like username, password,
date of birth, address, and other data related to application. Now in order to avoid
SQLIA we need to encrypt only those elds that we will use in conditional clause
of Sql query because with these elds only there will be a chance of SQLIA. For
encryption, we will use Bitslice AES. The 128 bit binary key which is equivalent to
16 ASCII character can be formed by appending rst eight character of username
and rst eight character of password. If username or password is less than eight
characters then binary bit 0 is appended to make it 128 bit long. Now using this
key all the relevant elds are encrypted and stored in database.
As an example, we can see registration page from Figure 4.1 that only [userid,
password] are used in Login page of Figure 4.2 and [degree, department, email id
and mobile number] are used in search page of Figure 4.3, so we need to encrypt only
these elds. After encryption these encrypted elds have to be stored in database.
22
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Figure 4.1: Registration Page
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Figure 4.2: Login Page
Login Phase
In login phase a user need to enter username and password. Now we need to match
these user credentials from the database but the username and password in database
are encrypted because of registration phase. So before matching username and
password with database encryption of both the elds with Bitslice AES is required.
The key can be formed in the same way as in registration phase. Here there is no
need to store secret key in database as done by Indrani et al. [12].
Search Phase
In search phase the user interacts more with database and can fetch any stored data
based on some specic elds given in search form. As we know these specic elds
are stored in encrypted form in the database so we need to encrypt these elds before
ring SQL query.
4.1 Prevention of SQLIA using Bitslice AES
Most web application include login page with two basic elds "user id" and
"password" that form a single SQL query as follow :
24
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Figure 4.3: Search Page
SELECT "user" from "tablename" where userid= ` ' and password= ` ';
Here we need just two encryption one for user id and other for password but
suppose after login in our web application we need more interaction with database
and more number of eld are present in other web pages.
Let us consider the search form in Figure 4.3, it has four elds. Some of the
corresponding SOL queries to fetch relevant data from the table are as follow :
SELECT * from "tablename" where id = ` ';
SELECT * from "tablename" where degree = ` ' and dept = ` ';
SELECT * from "tablename" where eid =` ';
So we need to do four encryption before appending the elds in these sql queries.
Now suppose if millions of users are accessing the search page at the same moment
then in total it require (Four x Million) encryptions and hence we need a better
solution to handle this situation.
We can solve this problem using Bit slice AES in a much ecient way, Suppose
if M users are present and there are N elds in the webpage then N X M encryption
can be done in parallel. To handle such requests we need to maintain a queue, where
all the requests keeps on adding and later for encryption same as the number of bits
of microprocessor string are fetched from queue. Each character string from the
25
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elds of web page is converted to corresponding 128 bit binary string that form the
AES input. As each character takes 8 binary bits so there can be a maximum of 16
characters that can accommodate in 128 bit AES input. If number of characters are
less than 16 then we can append 0 to make complete 128 bit binary string and if
characters are more than 16 then we can do encryption using modern block ciphers
like Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode, Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode, Cipher
Feedback Mode etc. Now for encryption, according to Figure 3.4, the rst bit of rst
string will go to rst bit of rst word, the second bit of rst string will go to second
bit of rst word and in similar way one hundred twenty eighth bit of string will go
to one hundred twenty eighth bit of second word. Now the rst bit of second string
will go to rst bit of third word, the second bit of second string will go to second bit
of third word and in similar way one hundred twenty eighth bit of second string will
go to one hundred twenty eighth bit of fourth word and so on. So in this way we can
feed input to the bit slice AES and other operations can be carried out in similar way
as mention in section II. After encryption SQL query is red and the corresponding
attribute is matched from database table. If match is appropriate then user can
access the data from the table otherwise it is an injection attack. Again a new set
of 64 strings are fetched from the queue and sent to encryption process.
4.1.1 Example
Let us consider the Figure 4.5, here N users are accessing the web form at the same
time having four elds. As in 64 bit machine we can do 64 encryption in parallel
so there can be maximum of sixteen user's data that can be processed at the same
moment (16 users X 4 elds=64 encryption ). First of all the requests from users
are stored in queue then consecutive 64 strings are fetched from the queue. Then
each string is converted to 128 bit binary string. As we can see from the gure that
all the bits of string 0 are set to the rst bits of all words. Second strings have all
the bits on second bits of all the words and similarly for all other strings. After
encryption a new set of 16 users data is taken and this process continues till all the
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Figure 4.4: String storage in memory from sixteen users at a time from a web form
of four elds
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request has not nished.
4.2 Prevention of SQLIA using AES on CUDA
Most web application include login page with two basic elds "user id" and
"password" that form a single SQL query as
Here we need just two encryption one for user id and other for password but
suppose after login in our web application we need more interaction with database
and more number of eld are present in other web pages.
Let us consider the search form in Figure 4.3, it has four elds. Some of the
corresponding SOL queries to fetch relevant data from the table are as follow :
So we need to do four encryption before appending the elds in these sql queries.
Now suppose if millions of users are accessing the search page at the same moment
then in total it require (Four x Million) encryptions and hence we need a better
solution to handle this situation.
We can solve this issue using AES encryption on GPU in a much ecient way,
Suppose if M users are present and there are N elds in the webpage then N X M
encryption can be done in parallel. To handle such requests we need to maintain
a queue, where all the requests keeps on adding and later for encryption same as
the maximum number of GPU thread of CUDA block are fetched from queue. Each
character string from the elds of web page is converted to corresponding 128 bit
binary string that form the AES input. As each character takes 8 binary bits so there
can be a maximum of 16 characters that can accommodate in 128 bit AES input.
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If number of characters are less than 16 then we can append 0 to make complete
128 bit binary string and if characters are more than 16 then we can do encryption
using modern block ciphers like Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode, Cipher Block
Chaining (CBC) mode, Cipher Feedback Mode etc. After encryption SQL query is
red and the corresponding attribute is matched from database table. If match is
appropriate then user can access the data from the table otherwise it is an injection
attack. Again a new set of strings are fetched from the queue and sent to encryption
process.
In the table-lookup, Each T table contains 256 4-byte word entries and these 4
T tables make up for 4KByte of total space. In CUDA-enabled GPU, it includes
the global memory, shared memory, texture memory and constant memory. Among
them, the global memory can be congured up to 4 GBytes. Given the exibility of
the memory model, it is possible to eciently use the four T-lookup tables. Besides,
the core of CUDA-enabled GPU is a scalar processor. Therefore, there is no need to
combine instructions in vector operations in order to get the full processing power.
Furthermore, the 32 bit logical exclusiveor operation can be executed natively on
CUDA-enabled GPU. The pseudo-code of kernel function of our parallelized AES
algorithm implemented on GPU.
From gure , we can see that every GPU thread of CUDA block performs 4 table
lookups and 4 32-bit exclusive-or operations in each AES round on a state.
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Figure 4.5: Encryption process of N users using CUDA Architecture
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Besides, two arrays of 1KB shared memory are used for the input, reading data
from the rst and saving results of each AES round to the second one. Then the
arrays are swapped for the successive round. This strategy allows to complete the
encryption of the input block without exiting the kernel. So it is done without using
the CPU to manage an external for loop to launch sequentially all the AES rounds.
At the end of the computation, the resulted output data is written again in the
global memory and then returned to the CPU.
4.3 Summary
In this chapter, we have seen how Bitslice AES and AES encryption using CUDA
can be used to prevent SQL injection attack. The prevention process considered all
the phases of the application i.e Registeration, Login and Search phase.
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Implementation and Results
5.1 Implementation and Results using Bitslice
AES
In this section, we have considered three dierent systems as listed in table 5.1.
In order to get the benchmark of the performance of Bitslice AES the maximum
encryption per second on three machines is as shown in table 5.2.
Table 5.1: Machines Used for testing
Types Microprocessor CoreSpeed Memory O.S Compiler
1 Core i7-2600K 3.40 GHz 4GBytes Linux gcc 4.6.1-9ubuntu3
2 Celeron E3200 oc 4.00 GHz 2GBytes Linux gcc 4.6.2 SUSE
3 Core 2 Duo 3.15 GHz 2GBytes Linux gcc 4.6.2
For type 1 machine, we can see that maximum of 5802K encryptions can be
done in parallel and for Type 2 and Type 3, 4463K and 3500K encryptions .
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Table 5.2: Encryption per Second for dierent machines
Machine Encryptions per second
Type 1 5802K
Type 2 4463K
Type 3 3500K
Figure 5.1: Runtime Analysis
Therefore, Bitslice AES encryption reduces much overhead of encryption process
while preventing SQLIA.
Also to analyze Bitslice AES encryption, we have compared our proposed scheme
with two of the existing schemes. The rst scheme PSQLIA [17] is based on
hash functions and the second scheme PSQLIA-HBE [18] is based on Elgamal
cryptosystem. From the graph 5.1, we can see that with the increase in number
of users the time for encryption also increases for both PSQLIA and PSQLIA-HBE
scheme. But in proposed scheme the time to encrypt is much less then compared
scheme and also it is approximately constant.
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5.2 Implementation and Results using CUDA
In this section, we have considered three dierent systems as listed in table 5.3. In
order to get the benchmark of the performance of AES on GPU using CUDA the
maximum encryption per second on three machines is as shown in table 5.4.
Table 5.3: Machines Used for testing
Types Microprocessor Memory GPU O.S
1 i3 4GB 1333MHz GeForce 9800GT Linux
2 Core 2 Duo 2GB 2GHz GeForce 9600m Linux
3 i5 1 GB GTX 460 1024M Linux
Table 5.4: Encryption per Second for dierent machines
Machine Encryptions per second
Type 1 5745K
Type 2 1795K
Type 3 10527K
For type 1 machine, we can see that maximum of 5745K encryptions can be
done in parallel and for Type 2 and Type 3, 1795K and 10527K encryptions. This
achieves a great performance and SQLIA attack can be handled very eciently.
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Conclusion and Future Work
In this thesis, how Bitslice AES and AES encryption using Cuda can be used to
prevent SQL injection attack is presented. This makes it possible to handle large
users request in a much ecient manner without compromising the security. Bitslice
AES technique is also free from cache timing attack and second order injections as
well. Here we have also compared the performance of our proposed system with two
of other techniques and found that even if number of users increases for accessing
the web form but time to execute the requests always approximately constant. Still
there is much possibility to enhance this work by making bitslice AES to work on
GPU and other parallelization techniques.
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